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ABSTRACT
In recent years, several schemes have been proposed to detect
anomalies and attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) such as
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). Based on the analysis of sensor
data, unexpected or malicious behavior is detected. Those schemes
often rely on (implicit) assumptions on temporally stable sensor
data distributions and invariants between process values. Unfor-
tunately, the proposed schemes often do not perform optimally,
with Recall scores lower than 70% (e.g., missing 3 alarms every 10
anomalies) for some ICS datasets, with unclear root issues.
In this work, we propose a general framework to analyzewhether
a given ICS dataset has specific properties (stable sensor distribu-
tions in normal operations, potentially state-dependent), which
then allows to determine whether certain Anomaly Detection ap-
proaches can be expected to perform well. We apply our framework
to three datasets showing that the behavior of actuators and sensors
are very different between Training set and Test set. In addition, we
present high-level guides to consider when designing an Anomaly
Detection System.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Network security; Intrusion detec-
tion systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control System (ICS) security is fundamental to guaran-
tee the safety and reliability of industrial plants. Devices deployed
in ICS are often relatively old (e.g., > 10 years) and do not feature
even basic security schemes. A promising solution to secure ICS
are Process-Based Anomaly Detectors [4] that analyze the system
sensor readings and can be easily integrated with ICSs.
A number of datasets to design and study Anomaly Detectors
have been published (e.g., BATADAL [10], SWaT [8], andWADI [3]).
Those datasets consist of multivariate time series of sensor read-
ings that occurred in an ICS (real plant, testbed, or simulation).
Datasets for ICS anomaly detection are often provided in different
data captures. Usually, there are at least two data captures. The first
(generally used as a Training set) contains data collected during
normal operating conditions. The second (generally used as the
Test set) contains data collected while attacks are occurring.
Sensor data contained in ICS datasets depends on the control
logic configuration applied to the system. According to this system
configuration, data can be differently distributed even for normal
operating conditions between the two datasets. This can causes
false alarms in anomaly and attack detection. To the best of our
knowledge, no systematic analysis of the ICS dataset was done
before although it might have a big (overlooked) impact on the
performance of the detection schemes. Indeed, if we analyze results
obtained by state-of-the-art detectors for ICS in terms of Recall score
(i.e., True Positive Rate), rarely Recall surpasses 70% meaning that 3
alarms aremissing every 10 anomalies. This is a non-negligible miss-
rate, especially if we compare this result to what the application of
Machine Learning techniques achieves in other classification tasks,
e.g., image classification over CIFAR-10 dataset [7].
In this work, we propose a general framework to check whether
a given ICS dataset fulfills the properties of the signal that are
assumed to hold to detect anomalies (stable sensor distributions in
normal operations, potentially state-dependent). Our framework
compares different versions of ICS datasets captured from the same
industrial plant (testbed or simulation). This helps to understand
their degree of similarity and guides the design of an anomaly
detector. If two datasets from the same testbed and recorded at
different times have the same data distribution, it means that we
can feed the Anomaly Detection System with more Training data,
increasing the training phase performances. On the other hand, if
two datasets do not belong to the same distribution it may imply
that the initial condition of the recording phase were different, or
maybe some sensors ruined over time. These aspects must be taken
into account while designing an anomaly detector.
Our main contributions are:
• We present a framework to evaluate the suitability of a
dataset for Anomaly Detection tasks.
• The results of our framework applied to BATADAL, WADI,
and SWaT, three water distribution systems dataset by taking
into consideration the state of the actuators and the statistical
distribution of the sensors measures.
• A high-level guideline of best practice to take into consider-
ation when designing an Anomaly Detection System with
the presented dataset.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Industrial Control Systems
ICS security is a crucial topic to guarantee the proper functioning
of an ICS. Historically attacks to ICS have occurred [11], harming
the safety and reliability of the industrial plant. Security of ICS is
challenging since devices are often outdated and communication
among devices needs to be retro-compatible with insecure protocols
that do not support authentication or encryption.
For this reason, in recent years, process-based anomaly detec-
tors were proposed to overcome this technology and security gap.
Process-based anomaly detectors monitor process sensor readings
and detect anomalous deviations from system expected behavior.
2.2 Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) test is a non-parametric statistical
test. Given two distribution𝐴 and 𝐵, the K-S test measures whether
the observations in 𝐴 and 𝐵 belong to the same probability distri-
bution. For the implementation of the used K-S test [1], the Null
Hypothesis 𝐻0 states that the two independent samples considered,
𝐴 and 𝐵, are drawn from the same continuous distribution.
Given two cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝐴 (𝑥) and 𝐹𝐵 (𝑥)
the K-S statistic for the two function 𝐹𝐴 (𝑥) and 𝐹𝐵 (𝑥), indicated as
K-S score in the reminder of the paper, is the maximal difference
between their Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (ECDF):
K-S score = sup
𝑥
| 𝐹𝐴 (𝑥) − 𝐹𝐵 (𝑥) | . (1)
As reported in [1], if the K-S score is small or the p-value is
high, then we cannot reject the hypothesis, and therefore the two
samples 𝐴 and 𝐵 belong to the same distribution.
3 FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the framework used to analyze sensor
data distributions between ICS datasets. Our Framework, depicted
in Figure 1, is composed of an analysis of the sensors distribution
on the entire dataset (Section 3.1), and a state-based analysis (Sec-
tion 3.2 and Section 3.3). In particular, the upper side of the Figure
shows the analysis performed on the whole dataset, which output
the K-S score for each couple of sensors considered. Instead, the
Dataset 1
Dataset 2
K-S Test
Without
State Division
State
Comparision
K-S test
With
State Division
K- S score for
Every Sensor
State Division
Average
K-S score for
Every Sensor
Common
States
Figure 1: Framework showing the steps applied for the anal-
ysis. Orange boxes represent the obtained output.
bottom side shows the state-based analysis which output the per-
centage of common states between two datasets considered and
the average K-S score of each sensor after the state division.
3.1 K-S Test Without State Division
Given two sensor readings from two different datasets (e.g., Training
set and Test set), we used the K-S test to compare the sensor readings
data distribution in the two datasets to verify if the data for a given
sensor belongs to the same distribution. We used theMinMaxScaler
to scale all the sensors’ values with respect to the first of the two
datasets considered. Moreover, if one of the dataset considered
contains attacks (i.e., is a Test set), we removed the rowswith attacks
and we kept only the Normal samples. The goal of this analysis is to
compare if the distribution of the sensors under normal conditions
is equally distributed.
According to Equation 1, two distributions collected from the
same sensor in different dataset pass the K-S test if its K-S score is
lower than 0.20 and a p-value greater than 0.05. If this condition is
true, then the Null Hypothesis 𝐻0 cannot be rejected and the two
sensors considered record the same process distribution.
3.2 State Comparison
The second element that we considered in our analysis is System
State. We define System State, or state, as the combination of the
actuators values at a given time step. For example, if the systems
is composed of three pumps (P1, P2, P3) connected to two water
tanks (T1, T2), a System State 𝑆1 where P1: Open, P2: Close, and P3:
Open will be represented by the vector 𝑆1 =
[
1 0 1
]
.
If the dataset is composed of 𝑛 actuators with two discrete possi-
ble values (i.e., 0 = OFF and 1 = ON), then the System State space
can be composed at most by 2𝑛 states. Every time a certain System
State occurs, the physical process is supposed to have the same
statistical behavior. Given the state S1 from the previous example,
it is reasonable to suppose that tank T1 connected to inlet pump P1
and outlet pump P2, would raise its level while tank T3 connected
to inlet pump P2 and outlet pump P3 are emptying. It is reasonable
to assume this hypothesis if the internal logic of the controllers
and the conditions that change the state of the actuators are not
updated while the system is operating. In our analysis, given two
data datasets, we first extract all the different states in the dataset,
then we count how many states are common among the two ver-
sions of the dataset and therefore how similar are the operational
conditions of the two datasets. For example, given two datasets df1
and df2, we will calculate the percentage of states of df2 that are
also present if df1 and vice versa.
3.3 K-S Test With State Comparison
For each common System State between the two datasets (as re-
ported in Section 3.2) we extracted the sensor readings that occured
during a given state. Then we applied the K-S test to each couple of
sensors in the different datasets to identify which of themmaintains
the same behavior in the given state.
If the two datasets considered have 𝑛 common states, for each
sensor we would compute 𝑛 K-S scores. For a given sensor, K-S
scores are then averaged according to Equation 2, to obtain the
Average K-S score per sensor (across all the states).
AVG K-S score per sensor =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑
𝑖=0
K-S score𝑖 . (2)
A sensor passes the test if its Average K-S score per sensor is
less then 0.20 (same as in Section 3.1). We must note that not all
states appear with the same frequency, some of them are very short,
while others are very long, and this could affect the results.
4 BATADAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Dataset Description
BATADAL dataset was released with ‘The Battle Of The Attack
Detection Algorithms’ [10], a competition to detect cyber attacks
on water distribution networks. BATADAL competition dataset was
generated with [9] which allows to model the hydraulic response
of a water distribution network under attack. The dataset is divided
into three data chunks: the first contains the sensor readings col-
lected during 365 days of normal operations, the second and the
third contain the sensor data collected during 14 cyber attacks.
BATADAL dataset features a collection of 43 sensors and ac-
tuators, i.e., water levels, the pressure at pumping stations, flow,
and actuator status. There are two versions of the dataset available,
the original one1 (i.e., TrainV1 and TestV1) contains replay attacks
to conceal the true system state. A second version2 (i.e., TrainV2)
contains sensor readings without concealment. This second version
is composed of two different Test sets (i.e., TestV2.1 and TestV2.2).
4.2 K-S Test Without State Division
Weperformed the K-S test over the various versions of the BATADAL
dataset. All the different versions of the dataset have the same sen-
sors and actuators. The results are reported in Table 1. Among the
three different datasets considered in this work, BATADAL is the
one with a lower K-S score between the sensors (i.e., it passes the
K-S test with a lower score than the other datasets). This is probably
because BATADAL is generated synthetically, therefore it is subject
to less noise. In Figure 2, the Violinplot is presented as example
of sensors not passing the K-S test. The Violinplot confirms the
effective different distribution of the sensors that did not pass the
K-S test and sensors which pass the K-S test.
4.3 State comparison
We reported in Table 2 the percentage of common state states
between a couple of datasets considered. The percentage of common
states between the different versions of BATADAL is higher than
1http://www.batadal.net/data.html
2https://github.com/scy-phy/ICS-Evasion-Attacks
Figure 2: Violinplot which compare the distribution be-
tween the sensors of BATADALTrainV1 andTrainV2. In par-
ticular FLOW_PU8, PRESSURE_J302, and PRESSURE_J306
failed the test, while FLOW_PU2, PRESSURE_J14, and PRES-
SURE_J422 passed the test.
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2.1 V2.2
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - - -
V2 26/31 - - - -
Te
st
V1 30/31 25/31 - - -
V2.1 26/31 31/31 25/31 - -
V2.2 31/31 31/31 27/31 31/31 -
Table 1: Number of BATADAL sensors which pass the K-S
test between the different dataset considered.
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2.1 V2.2
Tr
ai
n V1 - 39.77% 96.61% 76.00% 87.80%
V2 50.00% - 50.84% 76.00% 82.92%
Te
st
V1 81.42% 34.09% - 66.00% 80.49%
V2.1 54.28% 43.18% 55.93% - 87.80%
V2.2 51.42% 38.63% 55.93% 72.00% -
Table 2: Percentage of BATADAL state in common between
the two datasets considered (i.e., howmany states of the col-
umn dataset are contained in the row dataset).
the other dataset considered in this work. Again, this can be due to
the simulated environment on which BATADAL is generated.
4.4 K-S Test With State Comparison
We reported the results of the K-S test on sensors divided into states
in Table 3. In this case, the analysis of the system state performs
worse than the analysis of the whole dataset. However, results show
that at least eight sensors pass the test among all the common states
in the datasets.
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2.1 V2.2
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - - -
V2 10/31 - - - -
Te
st
V1 10/31 9/31 - - -
V2.1 8/31 13/31 8/31 - -
V2.2 9/31 13/31 8/31 11/31 -
Table 3: Number of BATADAL sensors which pass the K-S
test after the state division.
4.5 Discussion of Results
The overall result on BATADAL confirms the similarity of the
distribution of the sensors without state division and the common
states in the different versions of the dataset. The K-S test with the
state division shows that at least eight sensors preserve a common
behavior in a given state. We can conclude that BATADAL is a
suitable dataset to use in Anomaly Detection tasks in a state-less
analysis even if a state-based analysis can also be performed by
deriving invariants on the eight sensors previously identified.
5 SWAT ANALYSIS
5.1 Dataset Description
The Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) plant [8] is a scaled-down
water treatment plant able to produce five US gallons/hr of filtered
water. It consists of six steps process in which the water is gradually
filtrated and purified. Each step is equipped with a precise number
of sensors and actuators.
There are many versions of the SWaT dataset, opening also
a fragmentation problem when using it as a benchmark for the
detection algorithms. In the following, we reported the complete
list. We refer to the network traffic as the pcap dump of the network
communications and as physical data the value of the sensors and
actuators recorded:
• SWaT.A1 & A2_Dec 2015 contains 11 days of continuous oper-
ation, seven under normal operation (i.e., TrainV1) and four
days normal operations with attacks (i.e., TestV1). Among the
two sets of physical data under normal conditions provided
we considered Version 1 where the authors removing the
first 30 minutes of data corresponding to water drainage.
• SWaT.A3_Jun 2017 contains 136 hours of traffic and physical
data of normal operation without attacks (i.e., TrainV2).
• SWaT.A4 & A5_Jul 2019 includes three hours of normal op-
erating condition (i.e., TrainV3) and 1 hour during which
six attacks were carried out (i.e., TestV3). Among the two
versions of this dataset provided, we considered only the
second one which contains a correction on a column name.
• SWaT.A6_Dec 2019 contains a series of malware infection
attacks on the SWaT Engineering Workstation. The malware
attacks include Historian Data Exfiltration attack and Pro-
cess Disruption attacks. This version includes three hours
of SWaT running under the normal operating condition and
one hour in which six attacks were carried out (i.e., TestV4).
• SWaT.A7_May 2020 contains five recording of both network
traffic and physical data over 4 days under normal operation
Train Test
V1 V2 V5 V1 V3 V4
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - - - -
V2 2/25 - - - - -
V5 0/25 1/25 - - - -
Te
st
V1 6/25 2/25 0/25 - - -
V3 1/25 2/25 2/25 1/25 - -
V4 2/25 3/25 3/25 2/25 3/25 -
Table 4: Number of SWaT sensors which pass the K-S test
between the different dataset considered.
Train Test
V1 V2 V5 V1 V3 V4
Tr
ai
n V1 - <0.01% <0.01% 53.16% 0.0% 0.0%
V2 <0.01% - 28.00% 0.0% 50.00% 0.0%
V5 <0.01% 25.52% - 0.0% 0.08% 0.0%
Te
st
V1 57.53% 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 0.0%
V3 0.0% 11.46% 31.81% 0.0% - 0.0%
V4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -
Table 5: Percentage of SWaT state in common between the
two datasets considered (i.e., howmany states of the column
dataset are contained in the row dataset).
(i.e., TrainV5). Each run lasted four hours. Between each run,
there is a break of 30 minutes and a “reset run” of one hour,
for which no data was collected. We removed the first eight
hours because they are composed of empty data.
5.2 K-S Test Without State Division
Among the three datasets considered SWaT is the one with a highest
K-S score between the sensors. This result confirms the observa-
tion of other works [6, 12]. Therefore SWaT has a very variable
operational behavior. In particular, the version with the most dif-
ferent behavior is the last one, i.e., TrainV5. Version five of SWaT
implements 18 new sensors and six new actuators which cannot be
compared with the other versions, therefore we decided to remove
them. Furthermore, we removed five rows from this last SWaT
version due to “NaN” values and “Bad Input” values. The different
behavior of this version may be due to different usage of the testbed
with respect to the modality of the prior years, but it could also be
due to sensors degradation.
5.3 State comparison
Table 5 reports the results of the state comparison between the
different versions of SWaT. Among all the datasets considered this
is the worst result. This may be due to a change of logic in the
actuators code. After the first version of the dataset, the authors
introduced a new state in the actuators (i.e., actuators now also have
the state value “2”). Therefore both the Version 1 of the Training
set and Test set have no states in common with the other versions.
The TestV4 version does not have any states in common with the
other versions. This could be probably due to a reconfiguration of
the internal logic, or a different operating condition of the testbed.
Train Test
V1 V2 V5 V1 V3 V4
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - - - -
V2 6/25 - - - - -
V5 3/25 1/25 - - - -
Te
st
V1 0/25 N/A N/A - - -
V3 N/A 1/25 2/25 N/A - -
V4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -
Table 6: Number of SWaT sensors which pass the K-S test
after the state division.
5.4 K-S Test With State Comparison
Table 6 reports the results of the analysis based on the K-S test
with the state division. Due to the absence of common states in
many combinations (as reported is Section 5.3) there are many
results set to N/A, since it was impossible to perform the analysis in
those cases. The higher number of sensors that pass the K-S test in
the comparison between TrainV1 and TrainV2, TrainV5 is because
these versions have only a few common states, and these few states
have effectively a very common pattern. However, in this case, the
other comparisons highlight a very similar distribution between
the sensors in the same state, implying that in these cases the state
division performs better than the analysis on the whole dataset.
5.5 Discussion of Results
Among all the dataset considered, SwaT is the one with the most
different behavior between the various version considered, even
in the Training set and Test set related to the same dataset release.
These result confirms also the observation in [6, 12]. Therefore, we
can conclude that due to its instability, SWaT represents a very
challenging dataset to perform a Anomaly Detection.
6 WADI ANALYSIS
6.1 Dataset Description
WAter DIstribution (WADI) [3] is a realistic ICS testbed that re-
produces a water distribution network. It comprises two elevated
reservoir tanks, six consumer tanks, and a return tank (for water
recycling purposes). It is controlled by 103 sensors and actuators
connected to three PLCs. Each PLC controls one of the following
stages: P1 (Primary supply and analysis), P2 (Elevated reservoir
with Domestic grid and leak detection), and P3 (Return process).
The dataset is divided into two data chunks, the first contains 14
days of normal operations, the second contains 15 attacks on the
physical process that occurred over two days of operations [5].
There are two versions of the WADI dataset available on request.
As reported by the authors of the dataset, the newer version (i.e.,
V2) resolves some problems of the data contained in the first version
(i.e., V1). The new version refers to the same testbed run (i.e., V1)
but with about 35% fewer lines.
6.2 K-S Test Without State Division
The second versions of WADI have new sensors with respect to
the first version. In particular, both the Training set and Test set
of the second version of WADI contains 4 columns with entire
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - -
V2 80/84 - - -
Te
st V1 69/84 69/84 - -
V2 69/84 69/84 84/84 -
Table 7: Number of WADI sensors which pass the K-S test
between the different dataset considered.
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2
Tr
ai
n V1 - 100% 82.91% 83.33%
V2 77.72% - 79.19% 79.59%
Te
st V1 25.44% 31.26% - 100%
V2 25.44% 31.26% 99.49% -
Table 8: Percentage of WADI state in common between the
two datasets considered (i.e., howmany states of the column
dataset are contained in the row dataset).
“NaN” values.We removed them, together with the rows with “NaN”
values. In Table 7 we reported the results of the K-S test between
the different versions of WADI. As we can see WADI has a high
number of sensors passing the test, therefore the distributions of
the sensors are similar. When comparing the Training sets (since
they are the same dataset with some data cropped in Version 2), we
can observe that the test is passed by almost all the sensors.
When comparing the Train sets with the Test sets, our framework
reveals that there are 15 sensors that do not keep the same statistical
behavior between the Train set and Test set.
6.3 State Comparison
In Table 8 we reported the results obtained from the intersection
of states between the different versions of the WADI dataset. As
we can see the intersections above the diagonal of the matrix have
the highest score, it means that TrainV2, TestV1, and TestV2 have
a high number of states contained in TrainV1 (partially due to the
higher dimension of TrainV1 in term of size) and contains about
1900 different states. These results confirm that the TrainV2 is a
subset of TrainV1 while TestV1 and TestV2 are basically the same
dataset with some minor changes (one state of TestV1 not present
in TestV2).
6.4 K-S Test With State Comparison
The results are reported in Table 9. As we can see, WADI obtains
good results in this analysis.Whenwe compare the two Training set,
we can identify that there is only one sensor that fails the stateful
K-S test. This is due to the data prepossessing that deleted the
occurrences of a value for that sensor. When we compare Training
with the Test set, our framework identifies 18 sensors that maintain
the same statistical behavior in a given state.
Train Test
V1 V2 V1 V2
Tr
ai
n V1 - - - -
V2 83/84 - - -
Te
st V1 18/84 18/84 - -
V2 18/84 18/84 83/84 -
Table 9: Number of WADI sensors which pass the K-S test
after the state division.
6.5 Discussion of Results
The results on WADI highlight a similar behavior among the dif-
ferent versions of the dataset. From the state-less analysis, but also
from the state-based point of view, there are several consistent
sensors. We note that both the versions of the Training set (i.e.,
TrainV1 and TrainV2) and the Test set (i.e., TestV1 and TestV2) are
mostly equivalent with minor differences. We conclude that WADI
represents a good (but challenging) dataset to perform anomaly
detection, from both the consistent sensor behavior and the training
dataset size point of view.
7 RELATEDWORK
Anomaly detection in ICS is a popular topic in the related work.
There are many solutions proposed by different authors ranging
from Invariant-Based approaches [4], Machine-Learning Based ap-
proaches [6], or Fingerprint-based approaches [2]. Generally, to
validate the detection approach the authors use well-known ICS
datasets. In particular, the threemost used dataset are BATADAL [10],
SWaT [8], and WADI [3]. However, in the majority of anomaly de-
tectors proposed in the literature, the authors do not consider the
analysis of the statistical distribution of the datasets. In [6, 12] the
authors observed that the distribution of some sensors in these
datasets changes not only among different versions, but also in
the same Training set and Test set release. In particular, in [6] the
authors performed a modified version K-S test on one version of
each dataset, highlighting the different distribution between the
Training set and the Test set. However, the work proposed did not
investigate deeply the distribution of the different versions over
time. Moreover, in [6] the authors considered in the K-S test also
the actuators, which are composed of binary values and do not
follow any type of distribution.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a framework to evaluate the process data contained in
datasets for Anomaly Detection. The framework applies the K-S test
to evaluate how the data are distributed among two data captures.
It also investigates which states of actuators often occur over the
system, and checks the data distribution in a given state.
We applied our framework to three ICS datasets publicly avail-
able, and we found that SWaT dataset contains certain instability
in the sensor readings. The first step of our framework applies K-S
test without state division. By using this test, we found that for
BATADAL and WADI sensors readings are stable with at minimum
25/31 and 69/84 sensors passing the test respectively. Conversely,
in SWaT the K-S test reveals different distributions for the sensors,
with at maximum 6/25 sensors passing the test. The second step
of our framework checks the share of states among two data cap-
tures. If we compare the share between Train and Test sets, the
analysis reveals a good share of states in BATADAL dataset (with a
maximum 96.61% of share), followed by WADI (maximum 83.33%
of share) and SWaT (with a maximum 53.16%). As a last step, our
framework performs the K-S test to compare the behavior during
system states. This analysis reveals that in BATADAL there are at
least 8/31 sensors that on average pass the K-S test in all the states,
while in WADI they are 18/84 and in SWaT at most 6/25.
As a result of the application of our framework, we identified a
list of high-level guidelines that could help the development of an
Anomaly Detection System.
Check data distributions. Use a preliminary statistical analysis
to verify if the sensors of the Training Set and the Test set belong to
the same distribution. If the distribution of some sensors is different,
consider removing them, as they could raise false alarms.
Dataset instability.We observed that after an attack, the testbed
remains unstable for a long time. If the dataset does not recover
after the end of an attack, his behavior will be Anomalous even if
flagged as Normal. When designing a dataset the authors should
take this in mind, and for example, reset the system to restore the
normal conditions. Another solution could be to add another label
to classify the dataset, e.g., System unstable.
System configuration. By the designer of the dataset side it would
be useful to specify the system settings used for every data capture,
e.g., the logic of the controllers, the alarm values, and triggers.
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